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Abstract 
We examine the effect of stock liquidity and corporate governance on the firm's leverage 
decision in the order-driven stock trading system and less stringent governance environment 
of Australia. Using a sample of 1,207 non-financial firms from 2001 to 2013, resulting in 
9,855 firm-year observations, we find the posited negative stock liquidity–leverage relation, 
confirming prior research observations that firms with more liquid stocks are significantly less 
leveraged. We also find a significant and negative relation between corporate governance 
quality (CGQ) and leverage, indicating that firms with high CGQ significantly reduce 
leverage. In a closer analysis, we find that the significantly negative CGQ–leverage relation 
exists only for firms with high stock liquidity and does not exist for firms with low stock 
liquidity. Our study is the first to examine such an interactive relationship among stock 
liquidity, corporate governance and leverage. The results, which are robust to a range of 
alternative proxies and to additional tests, provide new insights into the determinants of 
leverage. 
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1 Introduction 
Despite over half a century of research effort since the pioneering work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), the debate on how managers make capital structure (i.e., leverage) decisions 
remains one of the most challenging issues in the corporate finance literature (Andres et al., 
2014; Jiraporn et al., 2012). Given the imperfection of the capital market in the real world, the 
decision—the choice between how much debt and how much equity managers use in 
financing firms’ investments—is an important one because an optimal capital structure can 
maximize firm value by minimizing the cost of capital. Clayman et al. (2012) argue that 
defining at which level of debt financing a firm reaches its optimal capital structure is difficult 
because this depends mainly on the firm’s stock liquidity (i.e., asymmetric information) and 
corporate governance. Prior studies have investigated the relation between stock liquidity and 
leverage (e.g., Lipson and Mortal, 2009) and the relation between corporate governance and 
leverage (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2012). However, these two relations have only been examined 
separately: No research has yet examined the two relations simultaneously. This study 
investigates the joint effect of stock liquidity and corporate governance on leverage, 
particularly in the Australian context, with its unique stock trading mechanism and corporate 
governance environment that affect a firm’s stock liquidity and corporate governance 
practices, respectively. 
Theories of capital structure (i.e., the static trade-off and pecking-order theories) predict a 
similar relationship between stock liquidity and leverage. According to the static trade-off 
theory, a firm with more liquid stock has a lower flotation cost for equity issuance, which 
makes the equity financing more attractive than debt financing. Thus, firms with more liquid 
stocks are expected to have a lower leverage. A few empirical studies have paid attention to 
stock liquidity as a critical determinant of leverage across the globe. Lipson and Mortal 
(2009) and Udomsirikul et al. (2011) document a negative relation between stock liquidity 
and leverage in the US and Thailand, respectively; Mohamed and Seelanatha (2014) find a 
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significant (insignificant) negative relation between liquidity and leverage in the pre-GFC 
(post-GFC) periods for Australian firms. However, the study by Mohamed and Seelanatha 
(2014) has methodological limitations (e.g., small sample size, limited liquidity proxies, 
inadequate estimation methods, and endogeneity bias) which are overcome in our study. 
The findings on the stock liquidity–leverage relation from other countries, particularly the 
US, may not be direcly applicable to the Australian market because of the differences in the 
stock trading mechanisms in the two countries. Whereas the US has a quote-driven stock 
trading mechanism, Australia has a pure order-driven trading system with the absence of 
market markers (Chai et al., 2010). In a quote-driven market, designated market makers 
continuously quote the bid and ask prices, which provides liquidity (Ali et al., 2015). In an 
order-driven market, public-limit orders establish the bid and ask prices and provide liquidity 
to the market (Chai et al., 2010). Evidence shows that the order-driven trading mechanism 
results in higher stock liquidity than the quote-driven system (Brown and Zhang, 1997). It is, 
therefore, interesting to know how stock liquidity affects leverage in an order-driven market. 
Given the increased use of the order-driven trading mechanism around the globe in recent 
years (Chai et al., 2010), we are motivated to investigate the stock liquidity–leverage relation, 
in conjunction with the corporate governance and leverage relation, within the order-driven 
Australian context. 
According to the agency theory, firms can use debt as a monitoring mechanism alternative 
to corporate governance for alleviating the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. The use of debt forces managers to make better investment decisions. So firms 
with poor governance are expected to have a higher leverage. Consistent with this theoretical 
argument, prior empirical studies articulate an inverse relationship between corporate 
governance quality (CGQ), by using a composite CGQ index that aggregates individual 
corporate governance variables, and leverage outside Australia (e.g., Haque et al., 2011; 
Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Jiraporn et al., 2012). For instance, Jiraporn et al. (2012), using a 
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composite CGQ index, find that a high CGQ reduces leverage. Australian studies (e.g., 
Brailsford et al., 2002; Yarram, 2013a, 2013b) narrowly examine the effect of individual 
governance variables (e.g., ownership structure, board structure and CEO duality) on leverage 
and find inconclusive or incomprehensive results. Yarram (2013a) finds that the proportion of 
independent directors, CEO duality and board meetings reduce leverage, whereas board skills, 
experience and board meeting attendance have no significant relationship with leverage. No 
research yet explores the impact of an aggregate index-based CGQ on leverage for Australian 
firms. From a wider regulatory perspective, research using index-based CGQ is needed to 
provide support for the development of a comprehensive code of governance practice, as 
opposed to the adoption of individual governance practices. 
The composite CGQ–leverage findings from other countries, particularly the US, may not 
be direcly applicable to Australia because of its markedly different corporate governance 
setting (Dignam and Galanis, 2004; Khan et al., 2014). The corporate governance system in 
the US, the outsider system, is characterised by a securities market with dispersed 
shareholdings where shareholders and firms interact at arms’ length, largely determined by 
the market forces. In the Australian corporate governance system, the insider system, with 
more concentrated shareholdings the roles of banks, families and non-financial corporate 
owners are crucial in corporate control (Dignam and Galanis, 2004). As the corporate 
governance environment in Australia is said to be less stringent than that of the US (Mendez 
et al., 2015), more cross-sectional variation in the governance practices of Australian firms is 
expected. Given such differences, we are motivated to investigate the composite CGQ–
leverage relation for Australian firms, which operate on the insider system, in conjunction 
with the stock liquidity and leverage relation.  
Extant studies examine the stock liquidity–leverage relation and the CGQ–leverage 
relation separately. To our best knowledge, no research to date has examined how stock 
liquidity and CGQ jointly influence leverage. On the one hand, better corporate governance is 
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believed to improve stock liquidity by improving the informational transparency of a firm 
(e.g., Ali et al., 2016; Chung et al., 2010). On the other hand, enhanced stock liquidity leads to 
less use of debt and more use of equity in the capital structure due to the reduced cost of 
equity (e.g., Lipson and Mortal, 2009; Udomsirikul et al., 2011). Combining these two strands 
of literature suggests that better corporate governance improves stock liquidity, and improved 
stock liquidity ultimately reduces leverage. Instead we posit that the inverse effect of 
corporate governance on leverage should be stronger for firms with greater stock liquidity. 
These ideas indicate the necessity of investigating how both stock liquidity in the order-driven 
market and CGQ in the insider governance system influence the leverage in Australia. In this 
study, we therefore aim to answer three key questions: 1. Do firms with higher stock liquidity 
experience a lower level of leverage? 2. Does corporate governance inversely relate to a 
firm’s leverage? 3. Is the negative relationship between corporate governance and leverage 
stronger for firms with high stock liquidity than for firms with low stock liquidity? 
We use a large sample of 1,207 non-financial Australian firms over the period from 2001 
to 2013, resulting in 9,855 firm-year observations. We use three proxies for stock liquidity, 
namely, time-weighted quoted spread (QS), Amihud illiquidity estimate (Amihud) and 
turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM), which capture three different dimensions of 
liquidity respectively: trading cost, price impact and immediacy. We measure corporate 
governance by adopting recommendations of the Horwath Report to construct a composite 
CGQ index. The Horwath Report is comprehensive and well recognized in the research 
community. Unlike the well-renowned US based governance index (G-index) of Gompers et 
al. (2003), which focuses on the resistance of firms to external control mechanisms, the 
Horwath Report places emphasis on the quality of a firm’s internal structures and processes 
(e.g., board structure, audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination committee), 
which are better suited to the Australian corporate control practices. Finally, we define 
leverage by using both book and market values of the firm.  
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Our fixed effect (FE) regression analysis shows that stock liquidity negatively affects 
leverage, suggesting that firms with higher stock liquidity exhibit a lower level of debt in their 
capital structure. We also find a negative relationship between CGQ and leverage, indicating 
that firms with high CGQ significantly reduce leverage. This relationship is stronger when we 
use market leverage, implying that firms can use higher leverage as a substitute for weaker 
governance mechanisms. In a closer analysis, we observe an interactive relationship among 
stock liquidity, CGQ and leverage: the results show that the significantly negative CGQ–
leverage relation exists only for firms with high stock liquidity; and it does not exist for firms 
with low stock liquidity. This interactive relationship provides empirical evidence that shows 
the effect of a high CGQ on lowering leverage prevails in highly liquid firms in the Australian 
context. This suggests that firms with low stock liquidity should achieve high standards of 
corporate governance to reduce leverage. The results are statistically significant, economically 
meaningful, and robust to a range of alternative proxies, to additional tests, and to 
endogeneity bias. 
The findings of our study contribute to three strands of corporate finance literature. First, 
while prior studies have well documented the stock liquidity–leverage relation (e.g., Lipson 
and Mortal, 2009) and the CGQ–leverage relation (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2012), there has been 
no prior research that examines the two relations simultaneously, although it is alleged that a 
firm’s leverage decision mainly depends on its stock liquidity and corporate governance (e.g., 
Clayman et al., 2012). Furthermore, a recent study (i.e., Ali et al., 2016) provides evidence 
that shows a positive relation between CGQ and stock liquidity. Despite the evidence that 
stock liquidity, corporate governance and leverage are related, and despite the theoretical 
prediction among them, how stock liquidity and corporate governance jointly determine 
firms’ leverage is largely unknown to us. Our study fills this knowledge gap. As far as we 
know, our study is the first globally that examines the interactions among market 
microstructure (i.e., stock liquidity), corporate governance and corporate finance (i.e., 
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leverage) in a single study. In particular, we document robust evidence that shows the 
negative relation between corporate governance and leverage is stronger and significant only 
for high liquidity firms.  
Second, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship between stock 
liquidity and leverage in the order-driven market of Australia. In particular, we address the 
methodological limitations associated with the earlier Australian study by Mohamed and 
Seelanatha (2014), which focuses mainly on the liquidity proxies constructed from low 
frequency data (i.e., Amihud and turnover) using a sample that excludes small firms although 
small firms consist of a substantial proportion of all listed firms in the Australian market 
(Christensen et al., 2015). In contrast, we extend the literature by incorporating proxies from 
both high frequency data (i.e., time-weighted quoted spread) and low frequency data (e.g., 
turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes) using a large panel dataset from 2001 to 2013. Hence, 
our findings may be generalizable to those wider markets using both microstructure and daily 
data2 and to all firm sizes (large, medium and small). Moreover, unlike their study, we 
improve understanding of the potential endogenous relation between liquidity and leverage, 
mainly by employing an exogenous shock to liquidity, which is a market microstructure shock 
unique to Australia, and our findings provide a certain extent of comfort that causality runs 
from liquidity to leverage.  
Third, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship between 
corporate governance and leverage in the less stringent governance environment of Australia. 
Existing Australian studies document evidence of the CGQ–leverage relation, based on 
individual governance variables (e.g., Brailsford et al., 2002; Yarram, 2013a, 2013b) and 
using a short panel dataset (i.e., 49 firms during 1989–1995; 465 firms during 2004–2010 and 
153 firms during 2004–2010, respectively). We provide the index-based evidence on the 
corporate governance–leverage relation, which may support the development of a 
                                                 
2 Microstructure data on transactions and quotes are required to calculate high frequency liquidity proxies 
whereas daily data on returns and volume are required for low frequency liquidity proxies (Ali et al., 2015). 
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comprehensive code of governance practices rather than individual governance practices. 
The reminder of our study is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant prior studies, 
theoretical background and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and method we use in the 
study. Section 4 explores the empirical findings of our study. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Stock liquidity and leverage 
Stock liquidity and leverage are two different types of decisions. Stock liquidity—a major 
concern for those who trade shares and those who create, manage or regulate trading 
infrastructure (Lipson and Mortal, 2009)—is made by the market participants. The leverage 
decision—one of the most important decisions in the corporate finance (e.g., Bhatia et al., 
2015; Jiraporn et al., 2012)—is made by the firms. These two decision types have different 
determining factors and, hence, different theoretical underpinnings. 
The static trade-off and the pecking-order theories have been used to explain the leverage 
decision and to predict a similar relationship between stock liquidity and leverage. The static 
trade-off theory, developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), suggests that firms trade off the 
net cost of equity against the net cost of debt when raising capital (e.g., Clayman et al., 2012; 
Lipson and Mortal, 2009). According to this theory, firms with more liquid stocks have a 
lower flotation cost for equity issuance that makes equity financing more attractive. For 
instance, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) document that enhanced firms’ stock liquidity 
lowers the cost of equity, resulting in a lower use of debt in the capital structure. Andres et al. 
(2014) also show that stock liquidity has a direct effect on equity returns, on the cost of 
capital and, thus, on shareholder value. Conversely, illiquidity is associated with a higher cost 
of equity capital (Frieder and Martell, 2006). Prior studies show that equity holders seek 
compensation by requiring a higher return for bearing costs of illiquidity (e.g., Brennan et al., 
1998; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). Stoll and Whaley (1983) also claim that small 
stocks that are illiquid are expected to produce a higher rate of return due to higher transaction 
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costs. Consequently, equity financing for firms with illiquid stocks becomes more expensive 
and, thus, less attractive than debt financing, leading to higher leverage.  
The pecking-order theory, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), suggests that firms 
choose methods for financing according to a hierarchy due to adverse selection and issue debt 
when internal financing is inadequate (Clayman et al., 2012). The adverse selection conditions 
that drive the pecking-order preferences (i.e., internal financing, debt financing and equity 
financing) may be reflected in trading costs to the extent that asymmetry between market 
participants is correlated with asymmetry between managers and the market (Lipson and 
Mortal, 2009). All firms have a certain level of asymmetric information, issuing more debt 
over equity when there is a high asymmetry in information (i.e., less liquidity) (Andres et al., 
2014).  
A few studies offer empirical evidence on this theoretical prediction of the stock liquidity 
to leverage relation. For example, Frieder and Martell (2006), using a panel of all firms listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), find that higher liquidity is associated with lower 
leverage. Using similar US data, Lipson and Mortal (2009) document that firms with more 
liquid equity use less debt and prefer equity when raising outside capital. However, the 
findings of those two US studies may not be directly generalizable to the Australian market 
due to the different trading mechanism used in Australia. Similarly, Udomsirikul et al. (2011), 
using firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), report that firms enjoying more 
liquid equity experience a lower cost of equity and may be motivated to adopt more equity 
and less debt in their capital structure. Findings of emerging markets like Thailand may also 
not be extendable to other countries like Australia, where financial markets are well-
developed and sophisticated. 
In contrast to those studies, the Australian studies report evidence from a microstructure 
point of view of the effect of liquidity on different aspects; namely, stock returns (Beedles et 
al., 1988); commonality in liquidity (Fabre and Frino, 2004); the role of closing call auctions 
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on liquidity (Aitken et al., 2005); and asset-pricing (Chan and Faff, 2003; Limkriangkrai et 
al., 2008). An exemption is the study by Mohamed and Seelanatha (2014), addressing a 
negative relation between stock liquidity and leverage. The findings of their study may not be 
generalizable to the wider economy because they exclude small firms from the analysis, even 
though small firms make up a substantial proportion of all listed firms in the financial markets 
of Australia and most other jurisdictions (Christensen et al., 2015). Their study, limited to the 
use of low-frequency proxies of stock liquidity, is characterized by a relatively small sample: 
they employ only two proxies of stock liquidity and use only 4,913 firm-year observations.  
Our argument, based on such theoretical predications and coupled with empirical evidence, 
is that firms with higher stock liquidity (due to either lower cost of equity or less asymmetry 
in information) lower the use of debt, which leads us to the following hypothesis. 
H1. Firms with higher stock liquidity experience a lower level of leverage. 
2.2 Corporate governance and leverage 
Agency theory analyses the relationship between shareholders (i.e., principals) and 
managers (i.e., agents), alleging that the rise of agency problems stems from the conflicts of 
interest between them (Clayman et al., 2012). To control such agency problems, internal and 
external mechanisms in the context of a corporation are necessary (McColgan, 2001). 
Corporate governance (internal mechanism) and leverage (external mechanism) can be 
substituted for each other in alleviating agency conflicts. Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the 
first to argue that the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are related to 
capital structure decisions (Bhatia et al., 2015). In particular, agency theory designs debt as an 
alternative governance mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Kochhar, 1996). It predicts a reduction in the net agency costs of 
equity resulting from increased use of debt (Clayman et al., 2012) because an increase in debt 
(i.e., higher leverage) motivates managers to use firms’ assets more efficiently, as they are 
bound to pay interest and repay principal.  
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As for the disciplinary role of leverage, corporate governance mechanisms provide 
monitoring of managers to protect shareholders (Christensen et al., 2015; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Good governance practices mean that the managers’ interests are better aligned with 
those of shareholders, leading to lower agency costs and higher shareholder value (Clayman 
et al., 2012). Conversely, firms with weak corporate governance suffer more severe agency 
problems, resulting in higher agency costs (Jiraporn et al., 2012). Gompers et al. (2003) also 
argue that the improved corporate governance and strong shareholder rights reduce related 
agency costs and improve investor confidence in firms’ future cash flow. Consequently, the 
firms’ ability to gain access to equity financing improves and reliance on debt financing is 
reduced (Drobetz et al., 2004; Haque et al., 2011). The substituting roles of corporate 
governance and leverage in alleviating the agency conflicts indicate an inverse relation 
between them. 
Prior studies have mainly employed US data to explore the nexus between corporate 
governance and leverage. Jiraporn and Gleason (2007), using the G-index, report an inverse 
relation between corporate governance and leverage, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt 
ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. Similarly, Jiraporn et al. (2012), using the 
composite corporate governance scores from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), find 
that corporate governance reduces leverage, suggesting that corporate governance and 
leverage are substitutes to each other in mitigating the agency conflicts.  
As opposed to the index-based evidence on the CGQ–leverage relation, Australian studies 
employ individual governance variables (e.g., ownership structure, board structure and CEO 
duality) to examine their effects on leverage. For example, using a small cross-sectional 
dataset (i.e., 49 firms) during the 1989–1995 period, Brailsford et al. (2002) examine the 
relation between ownership structure and leverage and find that firms with high ownership 
concentration hold a relatively high leverage, while the relation between managerial 
ownership and leverage is non-linear. Yarram (2013b) also finds evidence in favour of a 
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positive relation between ownership concentration and leverage for a sample of 465 firms 
during 2004–2010. Applying similar time-series to 153 large firms, Yarram (2013a) finds that 
the proportion of independent directors, the CEO duality and the board meetings reduce 
leverage, whereas board skills, experience and board meeting attendance have no significant 
relation to leverage. There has been no study in Australia that examines the CGQ–leverage 
relation using a composite CGQ index embracing individual governance variables, which is 
supposedly a better measure of corporate governance quality. 
Given the substituting roles of corporate governance and leverage in resolving the agency 
conflicts, we posit the following hypothesis. 
H2. Corporate governance quality (CGQ) of a firm is inversely related to the firm’s 
leverage. 
2.3 Stock liquidity, corporate governance and leverage 
Corporate governance provides monitoring mechanisms on managers. Better governed 
firms disclose more and better quality information to the market in a timely way, which 
improves firms’ financial and operational transparency. For instance, Beekes et al. (2015) 
show that better, compared to poorer, governed firms are priced more efficiently (i.e., news is 
priced earlier) in equity markets and can signal their quality by being more conservative 
relating to reporting good news. Ali et al. (2015) report that good corporate governance can 
prevent opportunistic managers from concealing and distorting information. Greater and 
better disclosure of information to the market has the effect of alleviating information 
asymmetries between insiders (i.e., managers) and outside investors, as well as among the 
outside investors (e.g., Chung et al., 2010; Millicent et al., 2008; Welker, 1995). This 
reduction in information asymmetries enhances firms’ stock liquidity and lowers firms’ cost 
of equity capital, resulting in lower leverage (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
Prior studies from the US (Chung et al., 2010) and Australia (Ali et al., 2015) report 
evidence of a positive relation between corporate governance and stock liquidity. Such studies 
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have examined the stock liquidity–leverage relation (e.g., Frieder and Martell, 2006; Lipson 
and Mortal, 2009) and the CGQ–leverage relation (e.g., Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Jiraporn 
et al., 2012) separately. However, as noted no research has yet examined the interactive 
relationship among stock liquidity, CGQ and leverage. We argue that firms with less liquid 
stocks and firms with more liquid stocks may observe different interactions among these 
parameters, as these different firms do not have the same level of transaction costs. Prior 
studies show that small firms’ stocks with less liquidity cause a high level of transaction costs 
(Stoll and Whaley, 1983) and may be expected to produce a higher rate of return. We 
therefore assume that the relation between CGQ and leverage is dependent on firms’ stock 
liquidity and postulate the following hypothesis.  
H3. The inverse relation between CGQ and leverage is stronger for firms with higher stock 
liquidity than for firms with lower stock liquidity. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The primary source of data is that of Australian firms listed on Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) during the period from 2001 to 2013. To construct our sample, we use the 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific database (SIRCA), which provides 
corporate governance and stock liquidity (e.g., share price and trading volume) data from 
2001. We retrieve financial data perfected by the firms’ annual reports from the Morningstar 
DatAnalysis Premium database. We initially obtain a raw sample of 13,500 firm-year 
observations from these databases. Following conventional practices (Chang et al., 2014), we 
exclude 3,321 firm-year observations from financial firms as they are subject to unique 
financial characteristics and operating regulations. We further exclude 324 firm-year 
observations due to missing data. The final sample comprises 1,207 non-financial firms, with 
9,855 firm-year observations. These sample firms belong to nine GICS sectors—materials 
(33%), industrials (16%), health care (9%), telecommunications services (2%), consumer 
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staples (4%), consumer discretionary (14%), information technology (7%), energy (13%) and 
utility (1%). Following Dang (2013) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the potential effects of extreme 
values. 
3.2 Variable definition and measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent variable: leverage proxies 
Previous studies adopt both book and market values to estimate a firm’s leverage (e.g., 
Chang et al., 2014; Gaud et al., 2005). In this study, we employ two definitions of leverage 
using book and market values. Prior studies continue to employ book leverage as a measure in 
both the Australian (e.g., Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Khan et al., 2014) and the US settings 
(e.g., Agha, 2013; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Strebulaev and Yang, 
2013), as this proxy largely depends on existing assets in place rather than on growth 
opportunities (Agha, 2013; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Myers, 1977). To be consistent with 
prior empirical work, we use the ratio of total debt to book value of assets as a proxy for book 
leverage (BL). 
𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                                         (1) 
Where 𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡 denotes the book leverage ratio of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of short-
term debt in current liabilities, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of long-term debt exceeding maturity of 
one year and 𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of assets. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Chang et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2012; Jiraporn et al., 2012; 
Liao et al., 2015), we define market leverage (ML) as the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets where market value of assets is the sum of book value of short-term debt and long-term 
debt plus market value of equity.  
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                                                                  (2) 
Where 𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 denotes the market leverage ratio of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the common 
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shares outstanding multiplied by the price of the last trading day (Lipson and Mortal, 2009) 
and other parameters are identical to those used in equation (1).  
3.2.2 Independent variables 
3.2.2.1 Stock liquidity proxies  
We proxy stock liquidity encompassing three dimensions, trading cost, price impact and 
immediacy, following prior studies (e.g., Ali et al., 2016; Chai et al., 2010; Udomsirikul et al., 
2011). The time-weighted quoted spread (QS) captures trading cost; Amihud illiquidity 
estimate (Amihud) and the turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) capture the price 
impact of trade and immediacy, respectively.  
First, we define the time-weighted quoted spread (QS) as the daily ratio of the time-
weighted bid-ask spread divided by the time-weighted mid-point spread averaged over the 
number of trading days in a financial year. This measure of QS is similar to the measure used 
by Aitken and Frino (1996) and Millicent et al. (2008): the higher the QS, the lower the stock 
liquidity. 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑄 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑖 =
1
𝑆𝑖𝑖
 �
𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑄𝑇𝑠𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑄𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇𝑡𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑖=1
                                                                 (3) 
Where 𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑄𝑇𝑠𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑠𝑄3𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the time-weighted bid–ask spread of firm i on day d of year 
y, 𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑄𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇𝑡𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑄4𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the time-weighted mid-point price of firm i on day d of year y, 
and 𝑆𝑖𝑖  is the number of days with available data for firm i in year y. 
Second, we compute Amihud’s illiquidity estimate (Amihud) as the daily ratio of absolute 
stock return to trading volume in Australian dollars, averaged over the number of trading days 
in a financial year: the higher the Amihud, the lower the stock liquidity. 
                                                 
3 𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑄𝑇𝑠𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
(𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝑖𝑖) 𝑋 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇1 + (𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝑖𝑖) 𝑋 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇2 + …+(𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝑖𝑖) 𝑋 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑛 
𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇1+ 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇2+⋯+ 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑛
 
4 𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑄𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇𝑡𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖 =   
(𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝑖𝐵)
2  𝑋 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇1 + 
(𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝑖𝐵)
2  𝑋 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇2 + …+
(𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝑖𝐵)
2  𝑋 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑛 
𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇1+ 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇2+⋯+ 𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑛
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𝑇𝐴𝑖ℎ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 =
1
𝑆𝑖𝑖
� �𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖�
𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑀𝑉𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖
                                                                                                           (4) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the absolute stock return of firm i on day d of year y, 𝑀𝑉𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the trading 
volume of firm i on day d of year y and 𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the number of days with available data for firm 
i in year y.  
Third, we estimate turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) to capture multiple 
dimensions of liquidity: the higher the LM, the lower the stock liquidity. 
𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = �𝑁𝑄𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  
1 (𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑇𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑖,𝑡)⁄
𝑆𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑠
� 𝑋 
252
𝑁𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑡
                                                                            (5) 
Where 𝑁𝑄𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the number of zero daily trading volumes for firm i in year t, 𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑇𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is 
the stock turnover for firm i in year t obtained from the sum of daily shares traded per year to 
the number of shares outstanding, 𝑁𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑡 is the total number of trading days in year t and the 
deflator is set to 480,000 as suggested in Liu (2006). Multiplication by the factor 252
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝐷𝑡
 
standardizes the number of trading days in a year as 252 and therefore makes LM comparable 
over time. 
3.2.2.2 Corporate governance proxies 
In this study, we construct a comprehensive measure of the CG index using the Horwath 
composite ratings on six categories: board structure, audit committee, nomination committee, 
remuneration committee, external auditor independence and codes of conduct and other 
policy disclosures. Previous studies on corporate governance use the G-index in the US, 
which is suitable for their outsider system in the country (e.g., Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; 
Jiraporn et al., 2012; Klock et al., 2005). With Australia’s insider system, internal CG 
mechanisms are more appropriate for measuring CG quality: the market for corporate control 
as a tool to discipline poorly performing managers is not effective (Pham et al., 2011). We 
therefore focus on the quality of internal structures and controls of the firms when 
constructing the composite CGQ index. 
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The Horwath report, which aims at the top 250 firms for the period from 2001 to 2008 with 
the proprietary arrangement of their ratings system (Ali et al., 2015), limits the 
generalizability of the findings. We overcome this limitation by extending our CG dataset 
across both cross-sections (small, medium and large firms) and time-series (2001–2013) on 
the objective categories, following Ali et al. (2015). As these categories consist of 17 criteria, 
we assign the value “1” if a firm meets the particular criteria and “0” otherwise. For example, 
on the independence of the board, if the majority of directors in a firm are independent, we 
assign 1 and 0 otherwise. We aggregate these individual values to construct a composite CG 
index (ranging from 0 to 17) where 0 indicates the “worst” governance and 17 indicates the 
“best” governance. Each governance category is the aggregate of the respective individual 
criteria. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
The choice between debt financing and equity financing by a firm largely depends on the 
firm-specific factors other than stock liquidity and corporate governance (Clayman et al., 
2012). Following previous studies (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Mohamed and Seelanatha, 
2014; Myers, 1977; Smith et al., 2015; Udomsirikul et al., 2011), we control for firm size 
(Size), tangibility (Tang), growth opportunities (MTB) and firm age (Age), which represent a 
positive empirical relation with leverage. In line with existing studies (e.g., Deesomsak et al., 
2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Smith et al., 2015; Udomsirikul et al., 2011) , we also include a 
series of variables that exhibit a negative empirical relation with leverage. For example, we 
use profitability (ROA), firm risk (Risk), non-debt tax shields (NDTS), asset liquidity 
(Assetliq), ownership concentration (Top-20) and the reciprocal of share price (STPrice). 
Finally, we include year effect (YR) in the model to capture possible variation overtime. 
Table 1 provides definitions of the dependent, independent and control variables employed 
in this study. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 here] 
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3.3 Empirical models  
We investigate three main issues, stock liquidity, CGQ and leverage, in the Australian 
context. First, we run the following panel regression (Eq.6) to examine the relation between 
stock liquidity and leverage (Hypothesis 1).  
𝐵𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1  𝑆𝑡𝑄𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝑄𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡  + �𝛾𝑗 
11
𝑗=1
 𝐶𝑄𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑄𝐷 𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑣𝐷𝑄𝑗 𝑖.𝑡
+   𝑄𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (6)    
In this model, the dependent variable is leverage, which is measured by book leverage 
(BL) and market leverage (ML). The independent variable is stock liquidity, which is 
measured using three different proxies (QS, Amihud and LM). The index i denotes individual 
firms (i = 1, 2,..., 1207), t denotes time period (t = 2001, 2002,……., 2013), α, j, γ are 
parameters, ui,t is the error term and α0 is a constant (refer to Table 1 for definitions of 
variables). 
We employ the following panel data model (Eq.7) to examine the relation between 
corporate governance and leverage (Hypothesis 2).  
𝐵𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1  𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑖,𝑡  + �𝛾𝑗 
11
𝑗=1
 𝐶𝑄𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑄𝐷 𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑣𝐷𝑄𝑗 𝑖.𝑡
+   𝑄𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (7)    
        
To measure CGQ, we use a composite CG index, the independent variable of this model. 
β0 is a constant and β1 is the vector of coefficient. The definitions of leverage and control 
variables, other parameters (j, γ), indices and the error term are identical to those used in 
equation (6). 
We investigate the effect of both stock liquidity and corporate governance on leverage 
(Hypotheses 1 and 2) by formulating the following regression (Eq.8): 
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𝐵𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛿0 +  𝛿1  𝑆𝑡𝑄𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝑄𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿2  𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑖,𝑡             
+ �𝛾𝑗 
11
𝑗=1
 𝐶𝑄𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑄𝐷 𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑣𝐷𝑄𝑗 𝑖.𝑡               
+  𝑄𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                              (8) 
              
In this model, we incorporate stock liquidity and CGQ as independent variables where 𝛿0 
is a constant and 𝛿1𝑡𝑁2  are the vector of coefficients. The definitions of stock liquidity, CGQ, 
control variables, other parameters (j, γ), indices and the error term are identical to those used 
in equations (6) and (7).  
Finally, to test whether the impact of CGQ on leverage differs between firms with high and 
low stock liquidity (Hypothesis 3), we estimate the following panel data model (Eq.9):  
𝐵𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  ɤ0 +  ɤ1  𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +  ɤ2  𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝑄𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡            
+ �𝛾𝑗 
11
𝑗=1
 𝐶𝑄𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑄𝐷 𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑣𝐷𝑄𝑗 𝑖.𝑡               
+  𝑄𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                              (9) 
 
In this model, we incorporate CGQ and the interaction term of CGQ*stock liquidity as 
independent variables where ɤ0 is a constant and ɤ1𝑡𝑁2  are the vector of coefficients. The 
definitions of stock liquidity, CGQ, control variables, other parameters (j, γ), indices and the 
error term are identical to those used in equations (6) and (7). 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main proxies of leverage (BL and ML), the 
stock liquidity (QS, Amihud and LM), corporate governance (CG index) and the firm-specific 
determinants. The statistics show that the average book and market leverage are 36% and 
27%, respectively. These values are significantly higher than those in the study of Mohamed 
and Seelanatha (2014), perhaps due to the much larger and hence more representative samples 
of our study. The mean value of QS is 0.05, which exhibits a lower variation compared to 
other proxies such as Amihud and LM. Among the three proxies of stock liquidity, LM shows 
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the largest standard deviation (SD=5.64); the CG index sample mean and standard deviation 
being 8.46 and 4.54, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 here] 
A few of the detailed statistics for firm-specific determinants, reported in Table 2, are 
worth highlighting. The ratio of market value to book value (MTB), measuring firms’ growth 
opportunities, is 2.48 on average. The Top-20 averages 63.6%, which indicates a high level of 
ownership concentration among the twenty largest shareholders, a feature of the Australian 
market as noted earlier. 
4.2 Stock liquidity–leverage (H1) and corporate governance–leverage relations (H2) 
We determine the stock liquidity–leverage relation (H1) and corporate governance–
leverage relation (H2) using the FE regression model5. Columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–6 in Table 3 
report the regression results of equation (6) for QS, Amihud and LM, respectively and 
Columns 7–8 report that of equation (7) for CGQ.  
As shown in Table 3 (Columns 1–6), the coefficients of the time-weighted quoted spread 
(QS), Amihud illiquidity estimate (Amihud) and turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) 
are all positive and significant at the 1% level, regardless of whether book or market leverage 
is employed. In general, coefficients on trading cost (QS), price impact (Amihud) and 
immediacy measures (LM) are inverse measures of stock liquidity, that is, high scores 
indicating low stock liquidity and vice versa (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). Hence, the positive 
coefficients indicate a negative relation between stock liquidity and leverage, suggesting that 
more (fewer) liquid firms choose a lower (higher) level of leverage6.  
                                                 
5 To choose between random effect and fixed effect, this study performs the Hausman test and the 
untabulated results confirm the appropriateness of the FE estimation. 
 
6 To provide further support for the effect of stock liquidity on leverage (H1), we also run similar regressions 
using zero return measure (Zero), liquidity ratio (LR) and stock turnover (TO) as alternative measures of stock 
liquidity and find that baseline results are robust with few exceptions. Similarly, we use long-term book leverage 
(LDB) and long-term market leverage (LDM) as alternative measures of leverage and confirm similar results as 
reported in Table 3. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 here] 
The coefficients of QS, Amihud and LM are consistent for book and market value 
measures of leverage, but are larger in magnitude for market value, which is in line with the 
findings of Mohamed and Seelanatha (2014) and Lipson and Mortal (2009). The explanatory 
power of Mohamed and Seelanatha (2014)’s model documents a decrease from 40.6% to 
36.3% when moving from book to market value. But in our study, the model on the stock 
liquidity–leverage relation shows an increase from 21.9% to 41.1% (using Amihud) when 
shifting from book to market value, attributable to our larger samples and better model 
estimations.  
These results support our hypothesis (H1), that firms with more (fewer) liquid stocks 
exhibit a lower (higher) level of leverage. The results, which are consistent overall with those 
of Lipson and Mortal (2009), Udomsirikul et al. (2011) and Mohamed and Seelanatha (2014), 
confirm the notion that liquid stocks reduce the net cost of equity and, therefore, induce firms 
to adopt more equity financing, causing less debt in the capital structure. However, our study 
takes advantage of the Australian order-driven trading mechanism, providing additional 
evidence of the stock liquidity–leverage relation by incorporating both high- and low-
frequency data.  
Columns 7–8 of Table 3 report the results of equation (7)7,8,9 for CGQ–leverage relation 
                                                 
7 To test robustness on the CGQ–leverage relation (H2) for Table 3, we also use board quality index (BOI), 
audit quality index (AQI), nomination quality index (NQI) and remuneration quality index (RQI) as alternative 
governance proxies and find that the baseline results are not sensitive. Similarly, we use long-term book leverage 
(LDB) and long-term market leverage (LDM) as alternative measures of leverage and find a statistically 
significant negative relationship between CGQ and long-term market leverage (LDM). 
 
8 Given that adoption of corporate governance mechanisms is likely to be different between small and large 
firms (Christensen et al., 2015), we also include the size effect on the CGQ–leverage relation (H2) where firms 
are grouped by market capitalization (top-500 firms or less) and size quintiles [small or large (firm size in 
quintiles 1–2 denotes small firms and 4–5 denotes large firms)]. Both classifications provide similar inferences 
that a statistically significant relationship exists between CGQ and leverage only in the subsample of top-500 
firms or large firms. This may be caused by that large firms have strong governance mechanisms (Agha, 2013). 
 
9 Though the GFC was not as severe in Australia (Mohamed and Seelanatha, 2014), we also capture the 
effect of GFC on the CGQ–leverage relation (H2) and document a significant reduction on this relation after the 
GFC. Importantly, we document that CGQ continues to hold its role in reducing leverage even in the post-GFC 
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for book leverage (BL) and market leverage (ML), respectively. The CG index is negatively 
and significantly related to book and market leverage at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
More importantly, the significance level of the CGQ–leverage relation strengthens (i.e., from 
10% to 1%) when leverage is measured by market value. The model for market leverage 
achieves a reasonable explanatory power as the adjusted R2 is above 32%.  
Our findings show that CGQ is also inversely related to firm leverage, using the composite 
index of the Australian context with the insider system and a less stringent governance 
environment, which is in line with our hypothesis (H2) and is consistent with prior empirical 
studies from the US and Bangladesh (e.g., Haque et al., 2011; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; 
Jiraporn et al., 2012). This result confirms the view that firms with poor governance are 
significantly more leveraged (Jiraporn et al., 2012). Prior Australian study (Yarram, 2013a), 
by narrowly examining individual governance variables, find results that are either 
inconclusive or incomprehensive. Our study, with the advantage of using a comprehensive 
composite CGQ index, contributes to the extant literature. From a wider regulatory 
perspective, these index-based findings are supportive of the development of a comprehensive 
code of governance practice, as opposed to the adoption of individual governance practices. 
4.3 Stock liquidity–CGQ–leverage relation (H1 and H2) 
In the previous sections, we report separately the negative relation between stock liquidity 
and leverage, and between CGQ and leverage. In this section, we examine the effect of both 
stock liquidity and CGQ on leverage simultaneously and report the regression results of 
equation (8) in Table 4. Columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–6 report the results for QS, Amihud and 
LM, respectively along with CG index and control variables. The estimated coefficients of 
QS, Amihud and LM for both book and market values are all positive and significant (at 1% 
level). This indicates that firms with improved stock liquidity significantly reduce leverage. 
CGQ is negatively and significantly (at 1% level) related to leverage for market value, but is 
                                                                                                                                                        
period. 
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insignificant for book leverage. More importantly, the results in Columns 2, 4 and 6 for 
market leverage report significantly higher adjusted R-square (R2 = 34.2%, 33.0%, 34.9%, 
respectively, p <0.01) than the results in Columns 1, 3 and 5 for book leverage (R2 = 12.7%, 
11.1%, 12.7%, respectively, p <0.01). This indicates that our regression equation (8) is well-
fitted into the model, representing market leverage rather than book leverage10. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 here] 
Overall, our findings in Table 4 indicate that firms with improved stock liquidity and high 
CGQ significantly reduce leverage. It is interesting to compare the coefficients on CG index 
in Table 3 and Table 4: when stock liquidity is included in the model (equation 8) and the 
analysis (Table 4), the coefficients of CG index decline substantially, although remaining 
significant, for market leverage, and become insignificant for book leverage. This implies that 
stock liquidity is a channel between CGQ and leverage, which is examined in hypothesis 3 
(H3). 
4.4 CGQ–leverage relation in firms with high and low stock liquidity (H3) 
To examine whether the impact that CGQ has on leverage differs between firms with high 
and low stock liquidity, we use the interaction term between stock liquidity and CGQ. Such 
an analysis is useful for examining if stock liquidity acts as a channel between CGQ and 
leverage (H3). As the coefficients of liquidity and governance measures move in opposite 
directions, we expect that the interaction effect of stock liquidity and CGQ on leverage would 
be contradictory. For example, in the previous sections, we have used three liquidity measures 
(QS, Amihud and LM) to explore the stock liquidity–leverage relation (H1) and the stock 
liquidity–CGQ–leverage relation (H1 and H2 together). Unlike the governance measure (i.e., 
CG index), these liquidity measures move in an opposite direction to stock liquidity, that is, 
the positive coefficient of these measures (i.e., wider spread) denotes low liquidity; the 
                                                 
10 We also examine the robustness on the stock liquidity–CGQ–leverage relation (H1 and H2) using alternative 
measures of stock liquidity (Zero, LR and TO) for Table 4 and confirm similar results with few exceptions. 
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negative coefficient (i.e., narrow spread) denotes high liquidity (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). To 
be consistent with the direction of governance measure, when we run regression we use stock 
liquidity as a dummy variable by assigning “1” for high liquidity and “0” for low liquidity 
rather than a continuous variable. 
 [INSERT TABLE 5 here] 
Table 5 reports the regression results of equation (9) and shows that the coefficients on CG 
index*QS are negative and significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively (Columns 1–2). 
Similarly, the coefficients on CG index*Amihud (Columns 3–4) and CG index*LM (Columns 
5–6) are all negative and significant at the 1% level. These results confirm that the 
relationship between CGQ and leverage is negative and stronger when stock liquidity is high. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on the CG index can be interpreted as the effect of CGQ on 
leverage when stock liquidity is low. Although the coefficients on the CG index are negative 
(in five of the six cases), they are insignificant, suggesting that CGQ does not reduce leverage 
for the firms with low stock liquidity. The ‘t’ values of the interaction terms (CG index*QS, 
CG index*Amihud and CG index*LM) also report significantly higher values across all the 
models (Columns 1–6), compared with those of the CG index. Overall, the results indicate 
that the significantly negative CGQ–leverage relation exists for firms with high stock liquidity 
only and not for firms with low stock liquidity. 
Rather than use a liquidity dummy, we treat stock liquidity in continuous form but reverse 
the scale of CG index11, 12 to confirm both variables moving in a similar direction. As shown 
in Panel A of Table 6, the coefficients on reversed CG index*QS, reversed CG index*Amihud 
and reversed CG index*LM are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
positive signs indicate that poor governed firms with poor liquidity increase firms’ leverage; 
                                                 
11 To reverse the governance measure, we deduct the original value from the addition of both maximum and 
minimum values of the CG index. 
 
12 We also reverse the initial liquidity measures to be consistent with the direction of CG index. The results show 
the negative and significant coefficients on the interaction of stock liquidity and CGQ and confirm that the 
leverage is lower in firms with better corporate governance and greater stock liquidity. 
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better governed firms with greater stock liquidity have a significantly lower level of leverage. 
This is consistent with our baseline results, further confirming hypothesis 3 (H3). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 here] 
We apply a method similar to that of Johnson (2003) to explore the inverse effect of 
corporate governance on leverage for increasing the level of stock liquidity. We analyse the 
results of leverage regression with a condition that allows the coefficients on the CG index to 
change across sample quintiles based on stock liquidity. We define the liquidity quintiles in a 
dummy form: high liquidity firms at the top 40% liquidity quintiles and the low liquidity 
firms at the bottom 40% liquidity quintiles. As shown in Panel B of Table 6, the coefficients 
on the CG index for the top liquidity quintile are negative and statistically significant at 
varying levels from 10% to 1%, indicating that the negative effect of corporate governance on 
leverage is stronger and significant for high liquidity firms only. 
We further examine the impact of CGQ on leverage for firms with high and low stock 
liquidity. If values of QS, Amihud and LM are lower than the median, they represent high 
liquid firms; otherwise low liquid firms. We report the regression results of equation (9) in 
Table 7. Columns 1–4, 5–8 and 9–12 indicate the results derived from the proxies of stock 
liquidity (QS, Amihud and LM, respectively)13. The results show that a statistically 
significant negative relationship between CGQ and leverage (either BL or ML) exists in high 
liquidity firms (significant in five of the six cases). 
[INSERT TABLE 7 here] 
Overall, the results confirm that the significantly negative CGQ–leverage relation exists 
only for firms with high stock liquidity and not for firms with low stock liquidity, which is in 
line with hypothesis 3 (H3). 
                                                 
13 We also use alternative measures of stock liquidity (Zero, LR and TO) and leverage (LDB and LDM) to 
investigate the robustness on the CGQ–leverage relation in firms with high and low liquidity (H3) and find 
qualitatively similar results as reported in Table 7. 
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4.5 Analysis of economic significance 
Table 8 reports the analysis of economic significance of the stock liquidity–leverage 
relation in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, of the CGQ–leverage relation in Panel D, and of the 
interaction effect of stock liquidity and CGQ on leverage in Panel E, Panel F and Panel G. We 
measure the effect of stock liquidity on leverage by calculating the marginal effect of an 
increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile and then multiply the difference by the 
coefficient, yielding a change in the leverage.  
The results show that an increase in the time-weighted quoted spread (QS), the Amihud 
illiquidity estimate (Amihud) and the turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) mitigates 
the decline in the book leverage by 10.9%, 6.5% and 11.6% and in market leverage by 15.0%, 
15.9% and 19.9%, respectively. However, the effect of stock liquidity on leverage is much 
stronger in the context of market value. 
 [INSERT TABLE 8 here] 
We observe similar patterns for the effect of CGQ on leverage. For instance, an increase in 
the CG index reduces the book leverage by 3.5% and the market leverage by 88.1% 
approximately. However, the economic significance on the CGQ–leverage is much stronger 
when leverage is measured by market value. We find similar results for the interaction effect 
of stock liquidity and CGQ on leverage. An increase in the interaction term (Index*QS, 
Index*Amihud and Index*LM) lessens the book leverage (3.0%, 6.1% and 6.1%, 
respectively) and the market leverage (8.1%, 12.2% and 12.2%, respectively). Overall, the 
economic significance for both the stock liquidity–leverage relation and the CGQ–leverage 
relation is much stronger where leverage is measured by market value. 
4.6 Endogeneity 
Corporate finance research, which attempts to explain the causes and effects of financial 
decisions, often has serious issues with endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). We address the 
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endogeneity issue in the stock liquidity–leverage relation (H1). Though stock liquidity affects 
leverage, the leverage to liquidity relationship may be endogenous. This may be consistent 
with the notion that debt forces managers to make better investment decisions (Jensen, 1986), 
and that managers also consider a potentially detrimental effect of illiquidity on firm value 
when making leverage decisions (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Andres et al., 2014). A 
few prior studies provide argument on the direction of causality running from leverage to 
liquidity. Frieder and Martell (2006) analyse the bi-directional relationship between leverage 
and liquidity and find that leverage influences liquidity, that is, as leverage increases, spreads 
decrease (liquidity increases). This finding is consistent with the idea put forth by Amihud 
and Mendelson (1989) that managers’ capital structure decisions reflect their concern that 
illiquidity reduces value. Similarly, Andres et al. (2014) argue that any change in capital 
structure has a feedback effect on information asymmetries between managers and outsiders 
and has a significant impact on liquidity, supporting the signalling hypothesis of Ross (1977). 
Furthermore, Ali et al. (2016), using Australian firms over the period from 2001 to 2008, 
document that leverage as a control variable causes stock liquidity. 
To rule out the possible endogeneity on the stock liquidity–leverage relation (H1) (either 
liquidity causes leverage or leverage causes liquidity), we apply an exogenous shock to 
liquidity, a method similar to that of Nguyen et al. (2016). We use the switch to broker 
anonymity implemented by the ASX on 28 November 2005 as an exogenous shock to 
liquidity. Prior to that date, broker ID of each order used to be disclosed in real time to the 
broker community and after the date, brokers can no longer observe the ID of other brokers 
submitting orders in the ASX (Nguyen et al., 2016). Therefore, we examine the change in 
firm’s leverage caused by the exogenous shock of the switch to broker anonymity to identify a 
causal effect of liquidity on leverage. In particular, we regress the change in firm’s leverage 
surrounding the switch against the change in liquidity from the financial year prior to the 
switch and the financial year after the switch (i.e., from 2004 to 2006) using following 
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specification (Fang et al., 2009).  
∆(𝐵𝑄𝑡𝑄𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑄)𝑖,04 𝑡𝑁 06𝛼0  +  𝛼1  ∆ (𝑆𝑡𝑄𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝑄𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡𝑙)𝑖,04 𝑡𝑁 06
+  �𝛾𝑗 
11
𝑗=1
  ∆ �𝐶𝑄𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑄𝐷 𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑣𝐷𝑄𝑗 �𝑖.04 𝑡𝑁 06  +   𝑄𝑖,04 𝑡𝑁 06                     (10) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 here] 
Table 9 shows similar results for all proxies of stock liquidity (i.e., QS, Amihud and LM). 
Specifically, the positive coefficients on QS, Amihud and LM in the regressions for ∆BL and 
∆ML indicate an inverse relationship between stock liquidity and leverage. Overall, the 
results reinforce the findings as reported in the baseline regression and confirm the causality 
from liquidity to leverage. 
To further check the causal effect from liquidity to leverage, we employ the dynamic two-
step system GMM to help incorporate all available in the cross-section and time series 
(Carstensen and Toubal, 2004). These estimates are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, 
reverse causality and dynamic endogeneity (if any) (Pathan, 2009). As in Columns 1–6 of 
Table 10, the residuals in the first difference (AR1) are statistically significant at the 1% level 
for all models but in the second difference (AR2) are insignificant as expected. Similarly, the 
Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions show insignificant statistics for all 
measures, which indicates the validity of the instruments. Finally, the number of instruments 
(i.e., 849) used in the models (1–6) is less than the panel (i.e., 1150), which makes the Hansen 
J-statistics more reliable. The results qualitatively remain similar to those reported earlier in a 
static setting. For instance, the statistically significant positive coefficients on QS, Amihud 
and LM on the stock liquidity–leverage relation suggest that firms with more liquid stocks 
experience a lower level of leverage. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 here] 
Similarly, we explore the issue of possible endogeneity on the CGQ–leverage relation 
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(H2). Prior empirical research suggests that corporate governance drives leverage (e.g., 
Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Jiraporn et al., 2012; John and Litov, 2010), but this may be 
plagued with endogeneity issues. We often cannot ascertain if the causation is actually 
reversed, that is, leverage drives corporate governance. However, direction of causality from 
leverage to corporate governance is less possible for two reasons as argued by Jiraporn et al. 
(2012). First, it is rather difficult for managers to modify the firms’ corporate governance, 
which usually requires shareholder approval and a lengthy period of execution. Second, no 
theoretical model suggests that a leverage decision leads to changes in corporate governance. 
Using two-step system GMM, we report the results in Columns 7–8 of Table 10 on the CGQ–
leverage relation (H2) and confirm similar results as reported earlier in Table 3. That is, the 
statistically significant negative coefficients of CG index on the CGQ–leverage relation 
suggest that CGQ significantly reduces leverage. 
To further check endogeneity on the stock liquidity–CGQ–leverage relation (H1 and H2), 
we estimate a regression using changes (first difference) in both the dependent (i.e., leverage) 
and independent variables (i.e., QS, Amihud, LM and CG index) instead of levels. The 
regression using first differencing offers at least three advantages. First, the results are 
generally less likely to show a spurious relation between variables (Chung et al., 2010). 
Second, this approach helps us to investigate the longer-term effect of independent variables 
on a dependent variable (Chung et al., 2010). Third, high values of auto correlation (about 0.5 
on average) can be reduced by first differencing (Andres et al., 2014). As shown in Table 11, 
the results show that the coefficients on the changes in QS, Amihud and LM are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that stock liquidity significantly reduces leverage. 
Similarly, CG index is negative and statistically significant in firms with market leverage and 
insignificant in firms with book leverage, as reported in Table 4. 
 [INSERT TABLE 11 here] 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we empirically analyse the relations between 1) stock liquidity and leverage; 
2) corporate governance and leverage; and 3) stock liquidity, corporate governance and 
leverage. In particular, we primarily investigate how both stock liquidity in the order-driven 
market and CGQ in the insider system of corporate governance influence leverage in 
Australia.  
Using a sample of 1,207 listed firms over the period 2001 to 2013, we find, consistent with 
our expectation, that stock liquidity affects leverage negatively, suggesting that firms with 
more stock liquidity exhibit a lower level of debt in their capital structure. We also find that a 
significantly negative relationship exists between CGQ and leverage, indicating that firms 
with high CGQ significantly reduce leverage. In a closer analysis, we observe an interactive 
relationship among stock liquidity, CGQ and leverage: the significantly negative CGQ–
leverage relation exists for firms with high stock liquidity only and not for firms with low 
stock liquidity. Our study, the first to examine this interactive relationship, provides empirical 
evidence that the effect of a high CGQ on lowering leverage prevails in highly liquid firms in 
the Australian context. The findings, which are more economically significant when market 
leverage is used as the proxy for leverage, are also robust to a range of alternative proxies and 
to additional tests, implying that stock liquidity and CGQ are important determinants of 
leverage, that the CGQ–leverage relation is dependent on firms’ stock liquidity. 
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, while prior studies examine the 
relation between stock liquidity–leverage and CGQ–leverage separately, we provide new 
empirical evidence that the effect of a high CGQ on lowering leverage prevails in highly 
liquid firms both in Australian and international contexts. This implies that firms with low 
stock liquidity should attempt to have high governance provisions in order to reduce leverage. 
To enjoy a lower cost of capital and so lower leverage, small and medium firms would need 
to improve not only CGQ but also stock liquidity. Second, our study presents robust evidence 
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that stock liquidity negatively influences leverage in the order-driven Australian market by 
incorporating both high and low frequency data, a large sample and an endogeneity bias. 
Finally, we enrich the literature of corporate governance and leverage by offering the first 
index-based evidence on the CGQ–leverage relation in the Australian context.  
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Table 1 
Variables, notations, and definitions 
Variable Notation Definition 
Proxies for leverage 
Book leverage BL (Short-term debt + long-term debt)/ book 
value of assets 
Market leverage ML (Short-term debt + long-term debt)/ (short-
term debt + long-term debt + market value of 
equity) 
   
Proxies for corporate governance  
Corporate governance index CGQ Constructed CG index based on 17 objective 
criteria of the Horwath report 
   
Proxies for stock liquidity   
Time-weighted quoted spread QS Daily ratio of time-weighted bid-ask spread 
divided by time-weighted mid-point spread 
averaged over the number of trading days in a 
financial year  
Amihud illiquidity estimate  
 
Amihud  Natural log of daily ratio of absolute stock 
return to trading volume in Australian dollars 
averaged over the number of trading days in a 
financial year 
Turnover-adjusted zero daily 
volumes 
LM Turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes  
 
   
Proxies for control variables   
Firm size Size Natural log of total assets 
Tangibility Tang Net property, plant, and equipment to total 
assets 
Growth opportunities MTB Market value to book value 
Firm age Age Natural log of number of years since the firm's 
listing 
Profitability ROA Earnings before interest and tax to total assets 
Firm risk Risk Standard deviation of the return  
Non-debt tax shields NDTS Annual depreciation expense to total assets 
Asset liquidity Assetliq Current assets to current liabilities 
Ownership concentration Top-20 Percentage of shares held by the top-20 
shareholders 
Share price STPrice Natural log of stock price 
Year effect YR Thirteen individual dummy variables which 
equals either “1” or “0” for each year from 
2001 to 2013, with 2001 being the excluded 
year 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean STD P25 P50 P75 
Leverage      
BL 0.36 0.24 0.13 0.35 0.54 
ML 0.27 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.43 
      
Stock liquidity      
QS 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07 
Amihud -14.03 2.83 -15.83 -13.50 -11.92 
LM 4.08 5.64 0.20 0.98 6.18 
      
Corporate governance      
CG index 8.46 4.54 5.00 9.00 12.00 
      
Firm-specific determinants      
MTB 2.48 2.29 0.90 1.68 3.14 
ROA -0.09 0.27 -0.15 0.01 0.08 
Assetliq 0.20 0.22 0.04 0.11 0.30 
Size 18.07 2.18 16.54 17.89 19.43 
Tang 0.22 0.23 0.03 0.13 0.38 
Top-20 63.59 20.49 50.45 65.77 79.20 
NDTS -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
STPrice -0.77 1.89 -2.12 -0.78 0.67 
Risk 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Age (in years) 13.73 10.46 5.52 11.17 19.41 
Age (ln) 2.27 0.92 1.71 2.41 2.97 
This table presents mean, standard deviation (SD), 25% percentile (P25), 50% percentile (P50) and 75% 
percentile (P75) for main proxies of leverage, stock liquidity and corporate governance along with control 
variables. The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. 
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Table 3  
FE estimates of stock liquidity on leverage (H1) and corporate governance on leverage (H2) 
 
 QS  Amihud  LM  CGQ  
  
BL 
(1) 
ML 
(2) 
BL 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
ML 
(6) 
BL 
(7) 
ML 
(8) 
QS 0.655*** 0.676***           
  (7.31) (9.04)           
Amihud     0.006*** 0.011***       
      (3.61) (7.08)       
LM         0.007*** 0.009***   
          (7.58) (10.67)   
CG index       -0.0018* -0.034*** 
       (-1.71) (-3.97) 
MTB 0.023*** -0.005*** 0.023*** -0.005*** 0.023*** -0.004*** 0.022*** -0.006*** 
  (11.02) (-3.70) (10.56) (-3.58) (11.10) (-3.16) (23.65) (-7.54) 
ROA -0.105*** -0.066*** -0.101*** -0.065*** -0.107*** -0.069*** -0.097*** -0.059*** 
  (-7.70) (-6.12) (-7.17) (-5.69) (-7.80) (-6.44) (-11.46) (-8.37) 
Assetliq -0.165*** -0.114*** -0.169*** -0.116*** -0.164*** -0.112*** -0.171*** -0.119*** 
  (-9.63) (-8.68) (-9.60) (-8.42) (-9.57) (-8.54) (-17.33) (-14.52) 
Size 0.035*** 0.073*** 0.027*** 0.069*** 0.035*** 0.076*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 
  (5.41) (16.25) (4.01) (13.92) (5.57) (16.77) (9.66) (31.43) 
Tang 0.176*** 0.079*** 0.175*** 0.080*** 0.173*** 0.076*** 0.174*** 0.079*** 
  (8.10) (4.84) (8.06) (4.92) (7.96) (4.64) (14.57) (7.93) 
Top-20 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.93) (-1.45) (0.45) (0.01) (-1.21) (-2.25) (1.50) (1.64) 
NDTS -1.417*** -1.026*** -1.432*** -1.062*** -1.438*** -1.053*** -1.417*** -1.039*** 
  (-8.84) (-8.22) (-8.93) (-8.48) (-8.95) (-8.42) (-14.56) (-12.83) 
STPrice -0.033*** -0.072*** -0.037*** -0.074*** -0.035*** -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.078*** 
  (-7.54) (-18.51) (-8.41) (-19.27) (-7.93) (-19.20) (-17.94) (-42.89) 
Risk -0.486*** -0.024 -0.834*** -0.521*** -0.061 0.503*** -0.638*** -0.185* 
  (-2.73) (-0.16) (-4.48) (-3.22) (-0.34) (3.30) (-4.79) (-1.67) 
Age 0.028*** 0.014* 0.029*** 0.015** 0.026*** 0.011 0.029*** 0.015*** 
  (3.29) (1.86) (3.43) (2.00) (3.10) (1.58) (5.60) (3.48) 
Constant -0.448*** -1.130*** -0.198* -0.867*** -0.469*** -1.193*** -0.218*** -0.904*** 
  (-3.90) (-13.99) (-1.80) (-10.35) (-4.11) (-14.71) (-4.99) (-24.89) 
Year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 
Adj. R2 0.233 0.422 0.219 0.411 0.233 0.428 0.109 0.321 
This table reports the results of FE estimation on the impact of stock liquidity on leverage (Eq.6, Columns 1–6) and on the impact of corporate 
governance on leverage (Eq.7, Columns 7–8). The independent variables include stock liquidity (QS, Amihud and LM) and CGQ measured 
by CG index following the Horwath CG report. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt to book value of 
assets (BL) and market value of assets (ML). The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent significant at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
 FE estimates of stock liquidity and corporate governance on leverage (H1 & H2) 
 
QS Amihud LM 
 
BL 
(1) 
ML 
(2) 
BL 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
ML 
(6) 
QS 0.652*** 0.669***         
  (13.59) (16.87)         
Amihud     0.006*** 0.010***     
      (5.23) (10.80)     
LM         0.007*** 0.009*** 
          (13.41) (19.27) 
CG index -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001*** 
  (-1.02) (-3.17) (-1.28) (-3.12) (-0.93) (-2.91) 
MTB 0.023*** -0.005*** 0.023*** -0.005*** 0.023*** -0.004*** 
  (24.87) (-6.35) (24.12) (-6.36) (25.25) (-5.50) 
ROA -0.106*** -0.068*** -0.101*** -0.066*** -0.107*** -0.071*** 
  (-12.61) (-9.80) (-11.94) (-9.44) (-12.73) (-10.23) 
Assetliq -0.165*** -0.113*** -0.168*** -0.114*** -0.164*** -0.110*** 
  (-16.86) (-13.96) (-17.04) (-13.99) (-16.72) (-13.72) 
Size 0.035*** 0.075*** 0.028*** 0.070*** 0.036*** 0.078*** 
  (13.95) (35.85) (10.89) (33.42) (14.09) (36.99) 
Tang 0.176*** 0.081*** 0.176*** 0.082*** 0.173*** 0.078*** 
  (14.91) (8.28) (14.75) (8.30) (14.64) (7.98) 
Top-20 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** 
  (-1.37) (-1.91) (0.74) (0.10) (-1.79) (-3.05) 
NDTS -1.426*** -1.048*** -1.443*** -1.083*** -1.446*** -1.073*** 
  (-14.81) (-13.16) (-14.83) (-13.46) (-15.01) (-13.54) 
STPrice -0.033*** -0.072*** -0.037*** -0.074*** -0.035*** -0.073*** 
  (-15.09) (-39.41) (-16.67) (-40.41) (-16.09) (-40.72) 
Risk -0.488*** -0.032 -0.833*** -0.518*** -0.066 0.491*** 
  (-3.69) (-0.29) (-6.03) (-4.54) (-0.47) (4.31) 
Age 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.012*** 
  (5.43) (3.25) (5.58) (3.44) (5.09) (2.74) 
Constant -0.454*** -1.147*** -0.207*** -0.886*** -0.475*** -1.208*** 
  (-9.75) (-29.76) (-4.75) (-24.53) (-10.04) (-31.04) 
Year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 
Adj. R2 0.127 0.342 0.111 0.330 0.127 0.349 
This table reports the results of FE estimation of equation (8) on the impact of stock liquidity and corporate 
governance on leverage. The independent variables include stock liquidity (QS, Amihud and LM) and CGQ measured 
by CG index following the Horwath CG report. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of 
total debt to book value of assets (BL) and market value of assets (ML). The definition of variables is provided in 
Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
 FE estimates on interaction effect of CGQ on leverage in high and low liquidity firms (H3) 
 QS Amihud LM 
 
BL 
(1) 
ML 
(2) 
BL 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
ML 
(6) 
CG index -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.74) (-1.17) (-0.30) (-1.17) (0.43) (-0.51) 
CG index*QS -0.001** -0.002*** 
    
 
(-2.07) (-6.27) 
    CG 
index*Amihud 
  
-0.002*** -0.003*** 
  
   
(-3.52) (-6.94) 
  CG index*LM 
    
-0.002*** -0.003*** 
     
(-4.73) (-7.43) 
MTB 0.022*** -0.006*** 0.022*** -0.006*** 0.022*** -0.006*** 
 
(23.72) (-7.31) (23.81) (-7.20) (23.86) (-7.24) 
ROA -0.098*** -0.061*** -0.098*** -0.061*** -0.100*** -0.063*** 
 
(-11.56) (-8.71) (-11.62) (-8.70) (-11.81) (-8.95) 
Assetliq -0.171*** -0.119*** -0.170*** -0.118*** -0.170*** -0.117*** 
 
(-17.33) (-14.56) (-17.26) (-14.40) (-17.19) (-14.32) 
Size 0.024*** 0.065*** 0.024*** 0.065*** 0.026*** 0.066*** 
 
(9.88) (32.12) (10.12) (32.24) (10.51) (32.40) 
Tang 0.174*** 0.079*** 0.175*** 0.081*** 0.174*** 0.079*** 
 
(14.59) (7.99) (14.67) (8.12) (14.61) (7.99) 
Top-20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.36) (1.22) (1.22) (1.10) (0.99) (0.85) 
NDTS -1.422*** -1.052*** -1.424*** -1.051*** -1.439*** -1.068*** 
 
(-14.61) (-13.02) (-14.64) (-13.02) (-14.79) (-13.22) 
STPrice -0.038*** -0.076*** -0.038*** -0.076*** -0.038*** -0.077*** 
 
(-17.36) (-41.39) (-17.44) (-41.96) (-17.55) (-42.34) 
Risk -0.668*** -0.261** -0.706*** -0.297*** -0.657*** -0.211* 
 
(-4.99) (-2.35) (-5.25) (-2.66) (-4.94) (-1.91) 
Age 0.029*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.016*** 
 
(5.66) (3.68) (5.68) (3.64) (5.68) (3.60) 
Constant -0.232*** -0.940*** -0.240*** -0.940*** -0.263*** -0.963*** 
 
(-5.25) (-25.62) (-5.44) (-25.69) (-5.90) (-25.98) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 
Adj. R2 0.109 0.324 0.110 0.325 0.111 0.325 
This table reports the results of FE estimation of equation (9) on the interaction effect of stock liquidity and CGQ on 
leverage. The independent variables include CGQ (defined as CG index following the Horwath CG report), 
interaction term of CG index and QS, interaction term of CG index and Amihud and interaction term of CG index and 
LM. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets (BL) and 
market value of assets (ML). The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represent significant at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
FE estimates on interaction effect of CGQ on leverage in high and low liquidity firms using reversed 
CG index and liquidity quintiles (H3) 
Panel A  QS Amihud LM 
 
BL 
(1) 
ML 
(2) 
BL 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
ML 
(6) 
Reversed CG index * QS 0.045*** 0.044***     
  (12.32) (14.41)     
Reversed CG index * Amihud   0.001*** 0.001***   
   (4.88) (7.87)   
Reversed CG index * LM     0.001*** 0.001*** 
     (12.30) (16.70) 
Reversed CG index -0.002** -0.000 0.008*** 0.012*** -0.001* -0.000 
  (-2.36) (-0.86) (5.16) (8.80) (-1.68) (-0.65) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 
Adj. R2 0.124 0.337 0.111 0.326 0.124 0.342 
       
Panel B QS  Amihud  LM  
 
BL 
(1) 
ML 
(2) 
BL 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
ML 
(6) 
CG index -0.002* -0.004*** -0.002* -0.003*** -0.002** -0.004*** 
 (at top 40% liquidity) (-1.71) (-4.41) (-1.72) (-4.25) (-2.04) (-4.34) 
CG index  -0.002* -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002* -0.003*** 
  (at middle 20% liquidity) (-1.68) (-2.74) (-1.07) (-2.38) (-1.69) (-3.06) 
CG index  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (at bottom 40% liquidity) (0.29) (0.38) (-0.12) (-0.10) (0.85) (0.64) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 9855 
Adj. R2 0.218 0.408 0.218 0.407 0.220 0.409 
Panel A of this table reports the results of FE estimation of equation (9) on the interaction effect of stock liquidity and CGQ on 
leverage using reversed CG index. The independent variables include reversed CG index, interaction term of reversed CG index 
and QS, interaction term of reversed CG index and Amihud and interaction term of reversed CG index and LM. Panel B reports 
the results of the above equation on the basis of liquidity quintiles. Quintile at the top 40% represents high liquidity firms while 
quintile at bottom 40% represents low liquidity firms. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt 
to book value of assets (BL) and market value of assets (ML). The coefficients of control variables are not reported in the interests 
of brevity. The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 
the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
42 
 
Table 7 
FE estimates of CGQ on leverage in high and low liquidity firms (H3) 
 QS Amihud LM 
  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
  BL 
(1) 
BL 
(2) 
ML 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
BL 
(6) 
ML 
(7) 
ML 
(8) 
BL 
(9) 
BL 
(10) 
ML 
(11) 
ML 
(12) 
CG index -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 
  (-2.33) (-0.60) (-3.45) (-1.25) (-3.77) (0.60) (-3.36) (-1.23) (-1.53) (0.62) (-2.67) (-1.09) 
MTB 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.000 -0.007*** 0.030*** 0.019*** -0.001 -0.006*** 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.001 -0.008*** 
  (25.18) (12.61) (0.30) (-3.78) (22.84) (13.93) (-0.67) (-3.42) (23.48) (11.97) (0.77) (-4.19) 
ROA -0.096*** -0.081*** -0.110*** -0.039*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.048*** -0.119*** -0.091*** -0.100*** -0.047*** 
  (-6.88) (-6.80) (-9.36) (-2.91) (-5.95) (-6.80) (-6.76) (-3.55) (-9.74) (-7.36) (-9.79) (-3.14) 
Assetliq -0.148*** -0.177*** -0.080*** -0.137*** -0.162*** -0.173*** -0.098*** -0.127*** -0.150*** -0.186*** -0.083*** -0.137*** 
  (-10.42) (-12.27) (-6.73) (-7.27) (-10.84) (-12.08) (-7.69) (-7.00) (-10.90) (-12.74) (-7.22) (-7.39) 
Size 0.073*** 0.001 0.093*** 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.003 0.091*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.004 0.094*** 0.058*** 
  (19.99) (0.35) (30.29) (8.33) (19.49) (0.79) (28.38) (8.98) (18.18) (1.04) (30.81) (8.75) 
Tang 0.160*** 0.139*** 0.059*** 0.081*** 0.154*** 0.137*** 0.050*** 0.082*** 0.175*** 0.145*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 
  (10.60) (7.15) (4.65) (3.26) (10.32) (6.78) (3.94) (3.13) (11.85) (7.05) (5.79) (3.02) 
Top-20 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
  (-4.04) (2.82) (-4.00) (2.28) (-3.67) (2.88) (-3.82) (2.16) (-3.03) (1.11) (-3.00) (1.19) 
NDTS -0.779*** -1.821*** -0.520*** -1.307*** -0.780*** -1.745*** -0.490*** -1.284*** -1.170*** -1.741*** -0.785*** -1.317*** 
  (-6.33) (-11.95) (-5.02) (-7.06) (-6.18) (-11.32) (-4.53) (-7.00) (-9.32) (-11.19) (-7.49) (-6.57) 
STPrice -0.060*** -0.027*** -0.103*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.029*** -0.102*** -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.030*** -0.091*** -0.071*** 
  (-19.39) (-8.00) (-39.58) (-12.17) (-19.06) (-8.66) (-38.14) (-12.91) (-16.80) (-9.10) (-36.12) (-12.93) 
Risk -0.623*** -0.651*** 0.276* -0.653*** -0.926*** -0.768*** -0.058 -0.517** -0.582*** -0.679*** 0.260 -0.485** 
  (-3.19) (-3.30) (1.68) (-2.94) (-4.61) (-3.84) (-0.33) (-2.34) (-2.87) (-3.55) (1.54) (-2.27) 
Age 0.009 0.037*** 0.001 0.018 0.008 0.029*** -0.001 0.016 0.009 0.040*** 0.001 0.023** 
  (1.41) (3.98) (0.15) (1.46) (1.28) (3.27) (-0.10) (1.36) (1.35) (4.67) (0.22) (1.98) 
Constant -1.036*** 0.092 -1.423*** -0.727*** -1.023*** 0.081 -1.362*** -0.796*** -0.972*** 0.088 -1.501*** -0.802*** 
  (-15.08) (1.37) (-24.59) (-6.53) (-14.66) (1.20) (-22.76) (-7.19) (-14.14) (1.29) (-26.18) (-6.86) 
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Year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4929 4926 4929 4926 4933 4922 4933 4922 4947 4908 4947 4908 
Adj. R2 0.121 0.025 0.452 0.314 0.094 0.011 0.403 0.325 0.129 0.015 0.397 0.355 
This table reports the results of FE estimation of equation (9) on the impact of CGQ on leverage in firms with high and low levels of stock liquidity, based on whether the firms’ stock liquidity 
position is above or below the median. The independent variable is CGQ measured by CG index following the Horwath CG report. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of 
total debt to book value of assets (BL) and market value of assets (ML). The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 
the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Analysis of economic significance 
Panel A ∆ QS (1) Coefficient of QS (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (3/4) 
BL 0.06 0.655 0.0393 0.36 0.1092 
ML 0.06 0.676 0.0406 0.27 0.1502 
      
Panel B ∆ Amihud (1) Coefficient of Amihud (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (3/4) 
BL 3.91 0.006 0.0235 0.36 0.0652 
ML 3.91 0.011 0.0430 0.27 0.1593 
      
Panel C ∆ LM (1) Coefficient of LM (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (3/4) 
BL 5.98 0.007 0.0419 0.36 0.1163 
ML 5.98 0.009 0.0538 0.27 0.1993 
      
Panel D ∆ CG index (1) Coefficient of CG index (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (3/4) 
BL 7 -0.0018 -0.0126 0.36 -0.0350 
ML 7 -0.0340 -0.2380 0.27 -0.8815 
      
Panel E ∆ CG index*QS (1) Coefficient of CG index*QS (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (5) 
BL 11 -0.001 -0.011 0.36 -0.0306 
ML 11 -0.002 -0.022 0.27 -0.0815 
      
Panel F ∆ CG index*Amihud (1) Coefficient of CG index*Amihud (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (5) 
BL 11 -0.002 -0.022 0.36 -0.0611 
ML 11 -0.003 -0.033 0.27 -0.1222 
      
Panel G ∆ CG index*LM (1) Coefficient of CG index*LM (2) (1 * 2 = 3) Average leverage (4) Economic significance (5) 
BL 11 -0.002 -0.022 0.36 -0.0611 
ML 11 -0.003 -0.033 0.27 -0.1222 
Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of this table report the analysis of economic significance on the stock liquidity–leverage relation using QS, Amihud and LM as proxies of stock 
liquidity. Panel D reports the analysis of economic significance on the CGQ–leverage relation using CG index as proxy of CGQ. Panel E, Panel F and Panel G report the analysis 
of economic significance on the interaction effect of stock liquidity and CGQ on leverage. ∆ refers to the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile on each independent 
variable. The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. 
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Table 9 
Estimates of exogenous shock to liquidity on stock liquidity–leverage relation (H1)  
 QS Amihud LM 
 
∆BL 
(1) 
∆ML 
(2) 
∆BL 
(3) 
∆ML 
(4) 
∆BL 
(5) 
∆ML 
(6) 
∆QS 0.952*** 0.840*** 
    
 
(3.32) (4.12) 
    ∆Amihud 
  
0.009* 0.010*** 
  
   
(1.75) (2.69) 
  ∆LM 
    
0.007** 0.004** 
     
(2.26) (2.09) 
Intercept 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.004 
 
(0.58) (0.47) (0.82) (0.79) (0.74) (0.67) 
∆control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662 
Adj. R2 0.168 0.250 0.158 0.239 0.161 0.236 
This table reports the results on addressing endogeneity in the stock liquidity–leverage relation using an exogenous shock to 
liquidity (Eq. 10). ∆ denotes the change in each variable from the financial year prior to the switch to broker anonymity to the 
financial year after the switch (i.e., 2004 to 2006). The independent variable is stock liquidity, which is measured by QS, 
Amihud and LM. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets (BL) 
and market value of assets (ML). The coefficients of control variables are not reported in the interests of brevity. The 
definition of variables is provided in Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at the10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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        Table 10 
            GMM estimates of stock liquidity–leverage (H1) and CGQ–leverage (H2) relations 
  QS  Amihud  LM  CGQ  
 
BL 
(1) 
ML 
(2) 
BL 
(3) 
ML 
(4) 
BL 
(5) 
ML 
(6) 
BL 
(7) 
ML 
(8) 
Lagged leverage 0.384*** 0.230*** 0.573*** 0.496*** 0.388*** 0.224*** 0.120*** 0.260*** 
 (14.84) (10.34) (31.18) (27.98) (15.04) (9.96) (5.70) (11.69) 
QS 0.447*** 0.432***       
  (4.41) (4.95)             
Amihud     0.007*** 0.006***         
      (4.42) (3.88)         
LM         0.005*** 0.006***     
          (4.54) (5.82)     
CG index             -0.005*** -0.004*** 
              (-2.80) (-3.39) 
Intercept -0.817*** -1.676*** -0.221*** -0.844*** -0.847*** -1.739*** -1.359*** -1.552*** 
  (-5.03) (-11.04) (-2.66) (-11.31) (-5.09) (-11.08) (-7.44) (-10.82) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR (1) -9.77*** -9.09*** -11.24*** -11.95*** -9.80*** -9.07*** -6.43*** -9.47*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR (2) 0.96 -1.40 1.21 -0.47 1.03 -1.37 -1.49 -1.28 
  [0.338] [0.162] [0.228] [0.639] [0.303] [0.170] [0.144] [0.199] 
Hensen J-statistics 853.46 856.66 953.51 989.68 846.25 853.8 858.67 846.55 
  [0.239] [0.216] [0.517] [0.219] [0.296] [0.237] 0.286 0.294 
Observations 8545 8545 8545 8545 8545 8545 8545 8545 
No of instruments 849 849 849 849 849 849 860 849 
No of firms 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 
This table reports the results on addressing endogeneity in the stock liquidity–leverage relation (Eq. 6, Columns 1–6) and CGQ–leverage relation (Eq. 7, 
Columns 7–8) using two-step system GMM. The independent variables include lagged leverage, stock liquidity (QS, Amihud and LM) and CGQ measured 
by CG index following the Horwath CG report. The dependent variable is leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets (BL) 
and market value of assets (ML). The coefficients of control variables are not reported in the interests of brevity. The definition of variables is provided in 
Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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   Table 11 
   Regression estimates with changes in the variables (H1 & H2) 
 QS  Amihud  LM  
 
∆BL 
(1) 
∆ML 
(2) 
∆BL 
(3) 
∆ML 
(4) 
∆BL 
(5) 
∆ML 
(6) 
∆QS 0.299*** 0.306***     
  (6.90) (8.88)     
∆Amihud     0.003*** 0.003***     
      (3.15) (3.20)     
∆LM         0.003*** 0.004*** 
          (6.60) (9.60) 
∆CG index -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** 
  (-1.08) (-2.40) (-1.08) (-2.42) (-1.00) (-2.28) 
Intercept -0.002 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.006*** 
  (-0.92) (-3.25) (-0.78) (-3.07) (-1.02) (-3.42) 
∆Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8405 8405 8405 8405 8405 8405 
Adj. R2 0.169 0.369 0.165 0.364 0.169  0.370 
This table reports the results of FE estimation of equation (8) on the effect of stock liquidity and corporate 
governance on leverage using changes (first difference) in both the dependent (i.e., leverage) and independent 
variables (i.e., QS, Amihud, LM and CG index). The coefficients of control variables are not reported in the 
interests of brevity. The definition of variables is provided in Table 1. t statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent significant at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
